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INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
AS IT PERTAINS TO TIlE NAVAL OFFICER
Wilfred A. Hearn
My subject is an introduction to
international law as it pertains to the
naval officer. My approach will be to
introduce you in general fashion to
some of the areas of concern to the
naval officer to which the principles of
international law apply. My aim is to
stimulate your interest in the direction
of the problems you will discuss during
this study and, by example, demonstrate the importance of having stored
in your arsenal of knowledge some of
the principles of international law which
you will need to know for decisionmaking purposes in the years ahead.
Without attempting to list them in any
order of importance, let me name a few
of the problems of an international
character which are current today:
1. The tendency of states to claim
an extension of sovereignty or jurisdiction over areas of the high seas.
2. The right of visit and search of
ships on the high seas.
3. The proposed convention on return of astronauts and space vehicles.
4. The visits of nuclear ships to
foreign ports.
5. NATO Multilateral Force.
6. Status of Forces Agreements.

At first you might think that these
are quite dissociated subjects, but there
is a common thread which ties most of
them together; that is, that two or more
countries are trying to work out a
solution to a problem, or a potential
problem, of military interest. The tool
that is being utilized is our subjectinternational law.
Thus, the scope of the subject matter
we are going to explore and study here
is as broad as the world itself. Some
problems are old, steeped with tradition
and state practice of long standing, such
as the law of the sea. Some are so new
we deal in terms of analogy rather than
precedent, such as the law of outer
space and the law of inner space. Some
are glamorous headline-makers. Many
are resolved with little public notice.

*

*

*

I am sure that some of you have
asked yourselves: Why study international law? What is its significance to
me as a military officer? With the
uniformed lawyers available in the military services, the political advisors
assigned to major commands, and the
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ready access to departmental headquarters and the Department of State in
Washington through modern communications, why should we, as military
officers, study or concern ourselves with
the study of international law? Perhaps
a good reason why you should, could be
given by the Commanding Officer of the
Hale who-while on patrol in the area of
the Grand Banks some few years agoreceived out of the blue an Operational
Immediate ordering him to intercept
and board a Russian trawler suspected
of cutting the transatlantic cables.
In reply to such a question, I would
say that international law problems of
military significance will become the
ordinary bill-of-fare for many of you;
and the more a military commander
knows about the subject, the better his
position to discharge his duties and
responsibilities. Further, a commander
would be hard pressed to request instructions when confronted with a novel
international situation unless he understood the legal implications and could
recognize and evaluate the salient facts.
Military officers, as a class, deal in
the arena of public international law
and international relations more than
any group in government with the exception of State Department personnel.
Our commanders on foreign soil do so
daily. The commander in Korea is
operating under an international organization, the United Nations, carrying out
or enforcing an armistice or truce. If he
is unfamiliar with its provisions, its
implications, and its legal significance in
the international community, he will be
hard pressed to fulfill the responsibilities reposed upon him. The commander
in Berlin must know the terms of the
agreement under which he is garrisoned
in Berlin and where the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization fits into the scheme
of things. How far can he go and still be
within the agreement; how far may he
permit the East Germans to go before
they violate the terms of the agreement;
and what would be the legal implica-

tions of each of these situations? The
commander at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,
must know the terms of the two treaties
and the lease agreement between the
United States and Cuba which govern
our rights to the Naval Base at Guantanamo, in order not to give Castro any
legal basis for abrogating these agreements.
The commanding officer of any military activity stationed in a foreign country must be familiar with the agreements under which he is operating, such
as base rights and status of forces
agreements. The commander at sea must
know the rights and obligations with
respect to international waters, territorial sea, and the rights of a man-of-war
in foreign territorial seas and in foreign
ports. The air commander must realize
the legal significance of foreign boundaries overflying foreign territory, and
other rights obtained from foreign governments. These are all matters involving international relations.

*

*

*

Up to this point, I have been speaking in terms of generalities. But it is the
specific cases and situations which have
arisen in the past, and which may be
expected to occur again in kind, that
demonstrate the significance of international law to the naval officer and to
military officers generally. As I mentioned a few moments ago, some problems are old and some are new. This
brings to mind the case of the yacht
Adventuress and the pilot boat Stormalong. The question presented was the
right, in time of peace, of the vessels of
one nation to visit and search vessels of
another nation which are proceeding
peacefully on the high seas between two
foreign ports. Factually, the Adventuress and Stormalong were two U.S.
registered merchant vessels, flying the
U.S. flag, proceeding between the ports
of two friendly countries in the Caribbean. There was some evidence that a
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third unfriendly Caribbean country
might attempt to visit and search these
ships. A U.S. Navy destroyer was dispatched to the scene with orders to
prevent any such action.
These orders were given under the
principle of international law that merchant vessels of one country, when
proceeding peacefully in pursuit of commerce, are not subject to visit and
search on the high seas by officials of
another country. An interesting thing
about this case is that the correspondence relating to the Adventuress and
Stormalong was found among some old
files in my office. The advice to the
Chief of Naval Operations from the
Judge Advocate General was dated April
15, 1936. The reason I cite this incident
is that it might well have happened
yesterday in view of our present relations with Cuba. It might well happen
again tomorrow. When it happens next,
by happcnstance, you might be the
commanding officer of the ship involved.
This question of the right of warships
to visit and search merchant vessels of
another country on the high seas has
arisen in various forms over the years.
The Santa Maria ineident, in 1961, was
such a casco As you may recall, a group
of Portuguese rebels under command of
Captain Henrique Galvao in January
1961 took command by force of the
Santa Maria as she was departing
Curacao on a return voyage to Lisbon.
There were 600 passengers aboard, including 42 Americans. Captain Galvao
professed to be seeking the overthrow
of the Portuguese Government. At the
request of the Portuguese Government,
U.S. naval forces undertook the recovery of the vessel. Action included
locating the Santa Maria and keeping
her under surveillance for several days.
It included negotiations on the high seas
between Rear Admiral Allen Smith, Jr.,
and Captain Galvao, with the result that
the Santa Maria was brought into Recife
by Galvao, the passengers were dis-

charged, and the ship was returned to
the Government of Portugal. This is
what our actions were designed to bring
about, and they worked.
A similar case was the seizure of the
Venezuelan freighter Anzoategue in
February 1963 by left-wing guerrillas
who were opposed to the government of
Venezuelan President Betancourt. The
Santa Maria and Anzoategue incidents
also involved, among others, international law questions of piracy and insurgency, in addition to the question of
visit, search and seizure.
We have noted the question of visit
and search of merchant ships. Let us
take a look now at warships. A warship
on the high seas is not subject to the
jurisdiction of any state other than her
own. Generally speaking, the same is
true of warships in foreign ports and
waters. The general doctrine is, therefore, that a warship remains under the
exclusive jurisdiction of her flag-state on
the high seas and during her entry and
stay in foreign ports. No legal proceedings can be taken against her either
for damages for collision, for a salvage
award, or for any other cause, and no
official of the territorial (or host) state
is authorized to board the vessel without the permission of the commanding
officer.
Are there any exceptions? It may
surprise some of you to learn that there
is one. by agreement-the Antarctic
Treaty which entered into force in June
1961. An article of the treaty states, in
order to promote the treaty's peaceful
objectives and to ensure disclosure of
violations of its prohibitions, that observers shall have complete freedom of
access for inspection. Specifically, it
provides: "All areas of Antarctica, including all stations, installations and
equipment within those areas, and all
ships and aircraft at points of discharging or embarking car~es of personnel in Antarctica, shall be open at all
times to inspection by such observers."
Does this provision in the treaty mean
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that U.S. Navy ships and planes in
Antarctica would have to submit to
inspections by Soviet observers? The
answer is probably yes.
The United States decided to exercise the right to unilateral inspection
during the current astral summer season,
and announced this decision to the
other signatories. The Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency prepared an inspection plan which was coordinated
with U.S. Government departments concerned, including the Navy. The plan
called for two teams of three civilian
observers to inspect foreign installations, ships, and planes. As a result of
inspections of Russian installations,
planes and ships, reciprocal inspections
by the Russians may be expected.
In regard to the sovereign immunity
of American warships, Navy Regulations
explicitly prohibit the commanding
officer from permitting his command to
be searched by any person representing
a foreign state. In order to preclude
posing a dilemma to our ship and
aircraft commanders, and in order to
comply with the treaty, the Chief of
Naval Operations has authorized inspection of Navy ships and planes by foreign
representatives in Antarctica. The literal
and intended interpretation of the
treaty does not restrict an observer to a
superficial topside inspection but would
permit an inspection of all compartments, right down to the bilges. The
observer could se~e everything in a compartment including safes, files, cabinets
and desk drawers. In effect, there is no
protected sanctuary aboard a Navy ship
or plane in Antarctica. For this reason,
CNO also has ordered all activities, and
ships proceeding to Antarctica, to remove any classified material that might
be compromised by inspection.

*

*

*

Turning from sea problems to those
on land, let us take a look at Cuba. With
the Castro regime hostile to the United

States, international law problems confronting us in Guantanamo have been
many and varied.
On 26 November 1963, we received
an Operational Immediate message from
the Commander Naval Base Guantanamo stating that a Cuban fishing
vessel, the Indalecio, had entered the
Guantanamo Defensive Sea Area. The
Cuban ensign was at half-mast and
someone was waving a white flag from
the bow. The vessel requested permission to enter the Naval Base for
"asylum." Mter boarding the vessel, it
was discovered that there were five men,
four women, and three children who
wanted to enter the base. Three crew
members and the captain were being
held at gunpoint. Castro's government
knew that these Cubans had arrived on
the base, since a Cuban Army officer
subsequently appeared at the northeast
gate and informally asked that the
refugees be returned to Cuba. We were
concerned that Castro would charge the
Cubans with being fugitives from Cuban
justice, and demand that we return
them to him under the terms of the
1903 treaty with Cuba. Article IV of
the 1903 treaty provides: "Fugitives
from justice charged with crimes or
misdemeanors amenable to Cuban law,
taking refuge within [the Base] shall be
delivered up by the United States authorities on demand by duly authorized
Cuban authorities." As a matter of
policy, the United States Government
frequently has stated that it intends to
comply strictly with the terms of the
1903 treaty.
The United States, as you know, has
never accepted the principle of giving
political asylum. Navy Regulations
:;pecifically prohibit naval officers from
granting political asylum, and permits
only the granting of temporary refuge
to persons in imminent danger from
mob violence. Since the defectors already were on the base, the only course
of action to avoid a later charge that the
United States was violating the treaty
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was to remove the refugees from the
base as soon as possible. The refugees
were sen t to Puerto Rico that evening.
Another Guantanamo problem was
one with which you are all familiar-the
water incident of 1964. On 2 February
1964, four Cuban fishing vessels were
observed by units of the United States
Coast Guard to be fishing off East Key
in the Dry Tortugas, Florida, within the
territorial sea of the United States and
in violation of U.S. law. At the time,
federal law contained no penal sanctions. Therefore, the boats and crews
were turned over to Florida authorities,
since the Cubans were fishing in violation of a Florida conservation law.
Castro labeled the U.S. actions as an act
of piracy. In retaliation, he decided to
deprive the Guantanamo Naval Base of
fresh water. Here is a case where our
water was cut off literally, but not
figuratively-for, as you know, we have
survived.
One of the knottiest and most recurrent problems to be handled by the
overseas commander is that of jurisdiction over military personnel who have
committed offenses in foreign countries.
The United States long ago recognized
the fact that the only true security in
the world today is collective security. In
furtherance of this concept, the United
States has entered into many alliances
with other nations of the free world in
order to protect itself as well as assist in
thc protection of these friendly countries. One such alliance is the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization. And, as a
part of our contribution to this partnership, we have stationed a sizeable number of our military forces in Europe. In
other friendly countries throughout the
world, our armed forces are assigned in
more limited numbers.
The understanding with each country
in which our forces are stationed ineludes specific arrangements with respeet to the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over these forces. This aspect of the
relationship between our forces and the

host state is sometimes controversial, as
with the Girard case in Japan, and, at
times, has received a great amount of
publicity.
The major concept of status of forces
agreements is the establishment of concurrent jurisdiction, together with a
scheme designed to divide the exercise
of jurisdiction between the authorities
of the sending state and the host state,
based upon the principle of primary
interest. In general, the military authorities of the sending state are given the
primary right to exercise jurisdiction
over a member of a force-or civilian
component-when the offense involves
the property of the sending state, the
person or property of a member of the
force, a civilian component of the
sending state, or a dependent; or if the
offense arises out of the performance of
official duties. In all other cases, the
receiving state has primary jurisdiction.
As you might imagine, the question of
whether an offense was committed in
the performance of official duty is not
always an easy one.
I am reminded of a meeting I had
recently with the Turkish Minister of
Justice on the occasion of his visit to
this country. During discussions with
the three service JAG's, the Minister was
asked if "duty certificates" were giving
the Turkish authorities any problems.
His reply went something like this: "An
American serviceman spends the day
fishing, and on his way home stops at a
tavern and has several drinks. He leaves
the tavern and is involved in an automobile accident which is clearly the
result of his drinking. The next morning
he shows up in court with a certificate
executed in behalf of his command
stating that at the time of the accident
he was in the performance of official
duties. Yes, duty certificates do give us
problems at times. " Of course, the
Minister was speaking hypothetically
and was not referring to an actual case.
But it points to the need for fair dealing
at all levels in order to gain the mutual
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respect needed for maintaining satisfactory relationships with officials of the
host states.

*

*

*

I have touched land and sea problems
confronting commanders. I would like
to mention a current legal problem that
confronts us in the air. The introduction
of modern high-speed, high-altitude
commercial jet aircraft and the attendant requirements for traffic control
systems, navigational aids, and extension of runways-among other thingshave increased the cost of maintaining
international air routes. In order to
defray .these increased costs, some states
have established a system of user
charges. These charges not only involve
payment for services rendered and supplies furnished-such as fuel-but also a
general charge for use of the system.
They are being imposed on state-owned
aircraft, including military aircraft, as
well as on civil aircraft. With respect to
the payment of aviation user charges
under international law, state aircraft
(including military aircraft), like warships, are deemed to be state instrumentalities. No military aircraft is authorized to fly over the territory of
another state, or land thereon, without
special permission. In case of such permission, the military aircraft should
enjoy, in principle-and in the absence
of special stipulation-the privileges
which customarily are accorded to foreign warships. These privileges include
immunity from search, seizure, and
inspection, and exemption from fees,
taxes, duties, and other charges paid
normally by civil aircraft. Of course,
charges related directly to supplies and
services specifically requested by the
aircraft commander should be paid. It is
our view that no other charges can be
required. Diplomatic representations are
being made to the various governments
involved.

*

*

*

Now let us look briefly at the developing law of the spaces-"outer space"
and "inner space." In the field of outer
space, the Legal Subcommittee of the
U.N. Committee on Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space considered two important
documents at a meeting in Geneva in
March 1964. The United States submitted two draft treaties: (1) Assistance
to and Return of Astronauts and Space
Vehicles; and (2) Liability for Damage
Caused by Objects Launched into Outer
Space. No agreed texts were produced.
As in the past, the military services will
participate with DOD in the development of the United States position
papers for the next meeting of the
committee. From these proceedings will
evolve another chapter in the law of
outer space.

*

*

*

I mentioned a few moments ago the
term "inner space." I use the term to
describe the vast areas of the deep
oceans and deep ocean floor. Admiral
Denys W. Knoll (the Navy's Oceanographer) prefers the term "oceanspace."
Others have called it "liquid space. " No
matter what you call it, it is an extremely and increasingly important area.
Figures show that salt water covers
71% of our planet, that 88% of the
oceans are 12,000 feet or deeper, that
the bottom slopes rapidly at the edge of
the continental shelf, falling precipitously from 600 feet to 12,000 and
then breaks more gently to the ocean
floor to depths up to 36,000 feet.
Contrast with the magnitude of these
depths the fact that we are able to
operate today only within the first few
hundred feet, and it is apparent that to
date man has been unsuccessful comparatively in conquering and subjecting
to his use the ocean depths. Man still
measures his conquests of the depths of
the sea in terms of feet when he is in
fact confronted with miles.
But we are making progress. The
successful exploitation of the oil re-
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sources of the continental shelf; the
discovery of manganese on the bottom
of the sea, leading to serious work on
surface mining of the sea bottom; the
development of the Polaris missile
which can be launched from the depths
of the sea; the successful extraction of
salt, fresh water, and seaweed from the
oceans; and the possibility of farming
the oceans for both plants and fisheries
resources all point up the importance of
the area. The obvious concern is
whether the law is keeping up with
technology. There are two bills before
the present Congress to appropriate
$50,000 for a study of the legal problems of management, use, and control
of the natural resources of the oceans
and ocean beds. In this area, we are
perhaps discussing "brand new" international law. At the very least, it is a
controversial area and one in which we
do not have customary practice to draw
on.
Do we extend the doctrine of freedom of the high seas down? Do we
extend the continental shelf doctrine
out? Do we treat the area as a no-man'sland or as the common property of all
nations? Or do we do a little of both?
With respect to the legal position of the
bed of the high seas, it would seem that
a distinction might be drawn between
the bed of the sea and its subsoiL
Publicists are not in accord. With respect to the bed of the sea, the better
opinion may be that it is incapable of
occupation by any state, and that its
legal status is the same as that of the
waters above it. The same reasons for
maintaining high seas unappropriated in
the interests of freedom of navigation
would seem to apply with equal force to
the bed of the sea. On the other hand,
the subsoil under the bed of the sea may
be considered capable of occupation.
There is perhaps less reason for extending the doctrine of freedom of the
seas to the subsoil beneath its bed.
From a military point of view, it may
be in our best interest with respect to

the bed of the sea to apply the doctrine
of freedom of the seas. When it comes
to navigation of submarines, we certainly are interested in free seas. When
we have deep submersibles that will
transit the bottoms by crawling, or by
partial physical contact with the bottom, we may also be interested in free
navigation of the ocean floor. On the
other hand, there will be those who will
advocate the adoption of the doctrine
that these areas are capable of being
appropriated by the first occupier. With
the advent of "fish-farms"-fish herding
by means of electric fences or bubble
barriers-mining operations and oil exploitation of the deep ocean floor, it is
inevitable that there will be those who
will, in the interest of developing the
resources of the sea, seek state protection of areas capable of exploitation.
As we take more and more from the
sea, not just along our coast but from
the open ocean, we may well need more
international agreements, perhaps even
the granting of rights for exploitation,
to resolve the conflicting interests. The
Navy has a vital concern in the technological development of the field of
oceanography, as well as the development of the law which will apply. The
subject is under active study in the
Department.

*

*

*

One of the most important principles
of international law to the naval officer
in the cold (and sometimes not-so-cold)
war environment in which we operate
today, is the right of self-defense. That
is the right to use the degree of force
appropriate to meet a threat to a unit of
our forces, or a threat to the security of
the United States. We have had occasion
to apply this principle in more than one
situation in the recent past, and the
latest example is the Gulf of Tonkin.
In connection with the experiences
of the Maddox and the Turner Joy, the
important facts are that these ships were
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in international waters at the time of
both attacks by PT boats of the North
Vietnamese; that they were attacked by
torpedoes and machine-gun fire to
which the destroyers responded with
5-inch batteries; and that the subsequent strikes on the PT boat pens and
the fuel dump were measured, calculated, and limited to that force necessary to destroy the threat to our continued use of an area of the high seas
where our forces have every right to be.
As stated by Ambassador Stevenson
before the Security Council, "The
action we have taken is a limited and
measured response fitted precisely to
the attack that produced it. " In summation, Ambassador Stevenson said, and I
quote:
Let me repeat that the United
States vessels were in international

waters when they were attacked.
Let me repeat that freedom of the
seas is guaranteed under longaccepted international law applying to all nations alike. Let me
repeat that these vessels took no
belligerent actions of any kind
until they were subjected to
armed attack. And let me say
once more that the action they
took in self-defense is the right of
all nations and is fully within the
provisions of the Charter of the
United Nations.
Now I am not really sure how the
missionary made out with the tiger I
referred to at the beginning of my talk,
but I sincerely hope that I have served
to whet your appetite for the subject of
international law. There is a lot here to
bite into.
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